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ABSTRACT
Machine learning is increasingly used to make sense of the
physical world yet may suffer from adversarial manipulation.
We examine the Viola-Jones 2D face detection algorithm
to study whether images can be created that humans do
not notice as faces yet the algorithm detects as faces. We
show that it is possible to construct images that Viola-Jones
recognizes as containing faces yet no human would consider
a face. Moreover, we show that it is possible to construct
images that fool facial detection even when they are printed
and then photographed.
1. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning is increasingly used to make sense of data
from sensors in the environment and for automated decision-
making. In this paper we look at 2D face detection. For
instance, face detection and face recognition have been used
for user authentication, tagging social media photos, video
surveillance, physical security, and other biometric security
measures.
Similar to other biometrics, the security of 2D face detection
and recognition depends on whether it is used in attended or
unattended settings. For example, a door thumbprint reader
in an empty corridor is vulnerable to attacks that would
not work in front of a guard at an entry gate. Attacks on
unattended use of facial biometrics have been well studied
from changing image perspective [2] to using a 2D picture of
an authorized person with cutouts for the eyes[1]. However,
these attacks might not be effective if attempted in front
of guards or even casual bystanders, as such an attack is
noticeable and easily detected.
The security of facial recognition in the attended setting
has not been well-studied. In some applications, it is the at-
tended setting that is arguably more relevant. For instance,
facial detection and recognition might be used for physical
security and area access control; because deployments might
include the presence of a guard or periodic video review, it
Figure 1: Two malicious images we generated with
our algorithms. The left image is detected as a face,
if fed directly into a face detector. The right im-
age is detected as a face, even after it is subjected
to distortions imposed by the physical world: when
displayed on a tablet and captured using a camera,
the resulting image is detected as a face 97% of the
time.
is important to know whether there are attacks even a hu-
man wouldn’t detect. Facial recognition could also be used
for authenticating to a computer or end-user device (ma-
chine access control); because there might be other employ-
ees present in the vicinity who might have an opportunity
to notice attacks, the attended setting is relevant here as
well. In either situation, holding up pictures of authorized
individuals could raise alarms. In this paper, we study at-
tacks on facial detection in the attended setting: we study
whether it is possible to fool face detection algorithms into
thinking an extra face is present, while preventing humans
(e.g., security guards, others in the vicinity) from noticing
the extra face.
Why study facial detection, rather than facial recognition?
Ultimately, it is the ability to fool facial recognition that
matters. However, facial detection algorithms are simpler
to study. In this paper we focus on the security properties
of facial detection. We view this as a first step towards the
longer-term goal of analyzing facial recognition. Also, be-
cause facial recognition algorithms typically begin by first
using facial detection to look for faces, then apply facial
recognition to each detected face, any attack on facial recog-
nition must begin by first fooling the facial detection step.
Thus, we believe our techniques may have lasting relevance.
The most commonly used algorithm for facial detection,
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Viola-Jones[7] §2, works using machine learning techniques
to build a classifier that determines whether a region of an
image contains a face or not. We construct successful at-
tacks on the Viola-Jones algorithm. One technical challenge
is that the facial detection algorithm only outputs a binary
signal: face or non-face. Thus we can not use normal tech-
niques for fooling classifiers, such as attempting to solve for
a solution or using gradient descent to search for inputs that
fool the classifier. Thus, we are forced to devise novel algo-
rithms for constructing images that will fool the Viola-Jones
classifier.
A second challenge is that the attacker cannot perfectly con-
trol the input to the classifier. Unlike spam, the adversary
does not directly control the input to the classifier. Rather,
the image passes through a noisy physical channel – the ad-
versary can display one image, but the image captured by
a camera will be reproduced only imperfectly. The signal is
degraded by blurring, random noise, and other effects. We
devise attacks that are robust to these effects.
Our approach uses a feedback-guided search algorithm to
construct an image that Viola-Jones recognizes as a face, yet
is unlikely to be recognized by a human. We select a cover
image C that does not contain a face; for instance, C might
be simply an all-white image. We start with an ordinary
image of a face (recognized as a face by humans and Viola-
Jones alike), F , and iteratively modify F . At each step we
make a small random modification to F to make it more
similar to C, but while ensuring that F remains recognized
as a face by Viola-Jones.
Essentially, our algorithm uses the Viola-Jones classifier to
provide feedback and guide a directed random walk through
the space of images, probing the decision boundary of the
classifier to search for an image that is as similar to C as
possible while still being classified as a face by Viola-Jones.
Through appropriate instantiation of this approach, we are
able to create digital spoof images that humans do not notice
yet Viola-Jones detects, if they are presented directly to the
facial detection algorithm with no modifications.
We then refine our algorithm to deal with degradation dur-
ing delivery imposed by the physical world. We imagine
conducting our attack in a simplified physical world, which
we model with a simulated analog channel, §6. By model-
ing the effects observed in our experiments, we are able to
create a reasonable simulation of the kinds of degradation
imposed by the physical world and then adjust our attack
(§8) to create spoof images that are more robustly detected
despite degradation imposed by the physical world.
Our attacks are successful. See figure 1 for two examples of
malicious images we generated using our techniques.
The contributions of this work are that we show new attacks
on facial detection; introduce a new algorithm to construct
inputs that fool a classifier, using binary outputs from the
classifier; and devise techniques for dealing with noise and
image degradation introduced by the physical world. The
next step for future research is to study the security of facial
recognition. If it is possible to extend our results to spoof
facial recognition as well, this might enable new, stealthier
Figure 2: Two of Viola-Jones’ early weak classifiers.
attacks on facial recognition: e.g., an attacker might be able
to print a spoof image on the front cover of a notebook and
casually hold in view of a security camera, thereby gaining
access to a protected computer or physical location. We
leave analysis of this threat to future work.
2. BACKGROUND
The industry standard for face detection is the Viola-Jones
classifier[7]. It accepts a grayscale image and produces as
output a boolean value, indicating whether the image is a
face or not. Typically, to detect all faces in an image, we
run the Viola-Jones classifier over all regions of the image
and see which ones it classifies as a face.
For completeness we provide a concise overview of Viola-
Jones classifier, but for purposes of this paper, it is not im-
portant to understand the details of how the Viola-Jones
classifier works. It is a boosted cascade classifier built out of
multiple weak classifiers and trained on a set of face and non-
face images. Each weak classifier computes the average in-
tensity within two rectangles, subtracts these two numbers,
and compares the result to a threshold to decide whether
that portion of the image might contain a face (see figure 2).
Early stages of the cascade use only a few weak classifiers
with large rectangles; later stages use more classifiers with
smaller rectangles. As a result, the Viola-Jones algorithm is
very fast.
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Our attack model in this work is that the adversary might
carry anything stealthy that lets them display an image
crafted to fool facial detection. For example, one possible at-
tack might be to carry a notebook with a printed image of a
spoof image while approaching a security access point. The
attacker could casually hold the notebook against his/her
chest and neck, as if they had just consulted some notes but
were now finished with the notes, as they walk through the
access point. Our attacks aim to cause the automated secu-
rity system to notice one extra person. Ultimately, the goal
would be to extend our attacks to fool facial recognition as
well, so the system sees an authorized person who is not ac-
tually there and allows the attacker through — though we
have not studied facial recognition, so our work should be
viewed as only a first glimpse at what ultimately might be
possible.
Many variants of this attack scenario are possible. Instead of
a printed image, the attacker could carry a flat-panel display
as part of the cover of a notebook, which might allow finer
control over the displayed image — this is the scenario we
focus on in this paper. One could also imagine an attacker
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Figure 3: An example face from the AT&T database
(left), and adjusted with flesh-toned background
(right).
who seeks to gain access to a computer that uses facial-
recognition-based login (rather than password-based login).
An attacker might find a publicly available image of the
face of an authorized user, then use our techniques to try to
disguise that image.
4. STARTER ATTACKS
Our attack starts with an ordinary image of a face, and
morphs it until it is no longer recognizable to humans as a
face. Roughly speaking, we do this by blending in enough
of a cover image so the original face is no longer detectable
to humans, while preserving enough of the original face so
that a face detection algorithm1 still detects the face.
Data. To illustrate our attacks we use faces from the AT&T
Database of Faces[6]. Each face is a 8-bit 112× 92 grayscale
image with a dark background. Before applying our attacks,
we use Photoshop’s magic wand tool to replace the dark
background and hair with a background the same tone as
the face. We also make the images 120 pixels tall by 96
wide by adding extra border pixels, to provide a bit more
robustness to cropping. See figure 3 for an example.
4.1 Starter Attack: Blend
A very simple attack would be to construct to the spoof
image as a blend of the face and cover image. Each pixel,
p, receives a fixed percent, r, of the cover value, with the
remaining percentage from the face value. Specifically,
spoofr(p) = r × cover(p) + (1− r)× face(p),
where r ∈ [0, 1] is constant for all p. We increase r until
spoofr is no longer detected by Viola-Jones. Figure 4 illus-
trates the attack with a cover image of granite.
This simple attack is unsuccessful. With a cover image of
granite, Viola-Jones detects a face only for values of r in
the range 0–0.16; humans can recognize a face for any value
of r in the range 0–0.58, so there is no value of r which is
accepted by Viola-Jones but not detected by humans. See
figure 4 for an illustration.
We tested three cover images and the attack fails for all
three. With cover images of granite, sand, and all gray, val-
ues of r above 16%, 8%, and 45% fail Viola-Jones detection.
1Viola-Jones as implemented by OpenCV v3.1.1 using
the haarcascade frontalface default.xml template file with
cv2.CascadeClassifier.detectMultiScale called with default
parameters plus CASCADE SCALE IMAGE
Figure 4: Blend attack showing the original face,
two blends, and the cover image. The blends are
the maximum percent of cover image that can be
blended in while ensuring Viola-Jones still detects
a face, and the minimum percent that yields some-
thing not recognized as a face by humans. The at-
tack fails as no blend percentages meet both condi-
tions.
Much higher values are needed to start deceiving the human
authors’ detection, 58%, 74%, and 95% respectively. There
is no overlap between the images where humans don’t see a
face and images where Viola-Jones detects a face.
4.2 Starter Attack: Random Subset of Pixels
We also tried a different strategy: instead of blending all
pixels, pick a random subset of pixels and replace them en-
tirely with the corresponding pixel from the coverage image.
One might hope this will preserve the region differences used
by Viola-Jones yet introduce enough detailed noise to fool
the human. Specifically, for a given face, cover image, and
fraction r, we choose
R = random set of r fraction of the pixels
and then define the spoof image as
spoofr(p) =
{
cover(p) if p ∈ R
face(p) otherwise
To test this approach, we created 300 random images for
each choice of four possible cover images and r in the range
[0.00, 1.00] in steps of 0.01. Cover images of granite, sand,
all-gray, and all-white were used. The authors viewed five
spoofs for each r, starting from r = 1.00, and judged when
a face is first human-recognizable.
This attack also is unsuccessful. Only the granite and sand
cover images had results that were at all promising. How-
ever, as Figure 5 shows, no spoofs were simultaneously de-
tected as faces by Viola-Jones and missed by the humans.
Thus this attack fails. But in the tail of the graph there are
images that Viola-Jones detected with r = 29%, which is
more than we saw in the blend attack, where r = 16% was
the maximum achievable.
4.3 Starter Attack: Random of Blend
Another natural idea is to combine the previous two attacks.
A slightly better attack might replace a percent, r, of ran-
dom pixels from the original face with some blend of the
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Figure 5: Random subset of pixels attack. The y-
axis shows the fraction of candidate spoof images
that were detected by Viola-Jones as a face. There
are no images where the face is detected by Viola-
Jones, yet missed by the humans. Only images built
from granite or sand hid the face from the humans.
face and cover image. For example, using the images of fig-
ure 4, we could replace some percent of random pixels in
the original face with the pixels from the 58% blend of gran-
ite. Specifically, for a given face, cover image, blend rate
b ∈ [0, 1], and fraction of blend pixels r ∈ [0, 1], the spoof
image is defined as
blendb(p) = b× cover(p) + (1− b)× face(p), (1)
R = random set of r fraction of pixels. (2)
spoofr(p) =
{
blendb(p) if p ∈ R
face(p) otherwise
(3)
We evaluated this attack in the same manner as the random
choice attack, except that for each cover image we created
three blends of 25%, 50%, and 75% cover. A random 300
images were created for each combination of cover image,
blend, and value of r.
Our results, in figure 6, show that we again can not sat-
isfy Viola-Jones while fooling humans. Viola-Jones detec-
tion rates drop as the blend rate and random set size in-
crease, and only two of the blends create a small range of
images that hide the face from the authors. However, the
bottom tails of the curves continue to show there are some
series of choices of pixels that continue to succeed even after
most other series of choices of pixels long ago failed. This
suggests that perhaps further improvement might be pos-
sible by adding some guidance from Viola-Jones about the
shift amount and/or choice of pixels.
5. ATTACK: RANDOM SHIFT (EXACT)
We build on these ideas to construct a more sophisticated
attack. The attack applies small random changes to the
image but reverts any changes that cause Viola-Jones to fail
to detect a face. From our starter attacks, we learned that
Figure 6: Random single blend attack: Detection
rate of faces that replace a random set of pixels with
a blend of the face and cover images. There are no
images where the face is detected by Viola-Jones,
yet missed by the humans. Only images built from
75% blends of granite or sand hid the face from the
humans. All other images, including based on blends
of gray or white, failed to hide the face from the
humans.
changing pixels only part way to the cover image allows us
to retain Viola-Jones detection longer, and that some sets
of pixel choices work better than others. We combine these
lessons by shifting random pixels small amounts toward the
cover image and undoing those changes that cause a failure.
Our attack procedure has two parts: a search routine picks
a suitable attack image while an oracle evaluates that attack
image. The search is very simple. We have a loop that picks
a random pixel, changes its intensity halfway closer to the
intensity of the corresponding pixel in the cover image, but
rejects the change if the oracle says the face is no longer de-
tected. The oracle checks whether a face would be detected
in the spoof image at the same location as it is detected in
the original face image. We first develop our attack, algo-
rithm 1, with an oracle that passes the attack image directly
to Viola-Jones, without accounting for any degradation that
might be caused by the physical channel.
Experiment. In preparing the data, we replace the area
around the face with the corresponding pixels from the cover
image (see figure 7). Much of the image background is not
used by Viola-Jones, when detecting the face centered in the
attack image, so we use Viola-Jones to detect the location
of this central face and preprocess our starting face to retain
just the face area pixels.
Results. This attack is successful. Because of our algo-
rithm, all the results of our exact algorithm pass Viola-Jones
detection. Typical results can be seen in the top row of fig-
ure 8, for cover images of granite, sand, all-white, and all-
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Algorithm 1: Exact attack
1 Function Search(F , C):
Input : Face image F ,
Cover image C
Output: Spoof image S
2 S ← F ;
3 while not Stalled(S) do
4 p′ ← a random pixel in S
5 T (p)←
Round
(
S(p) + C(p)
2
)
if p = p′
S(p) otherwise
6 if Oracle(T ) then
7 S ← T
8 return S
9 Function Stalled(S):
Input : Spoof Image S
Output: Boolean
10 Return True if S has not changed in last several calls.
11 Function Oracle(T ):
Input : Test Image T
Output: Boolean
12 Return true if Viola-Jones detects a face in T with
bounds within 10% of those of the face in F .
Figure 7: The face we used for the exact attack: the
original AT&T image (left) and after altering the
background and pasting the coverage image around
the face area (right).
gray. The granite, sand, and white attack images do not
seem to stand out as faces to the authors, with the white
attack image being particularly nice. In the other spoofs
we can see a grid pattern in the face region, presumably an
artifact of the Viola-Jones regions.
Discussion. The attack images in the results are successful
in terms of creating images detected by Viola-Jones as a face
but not noticed by humans as faces. Yet there is a problem.
They are not detected as faces if we display these attack
images on a retina resolution tablet, view them through a
webcam as in figure 9, and pass the resulting webcam cap-
ture to Viola-Jones. The changes present in the resulting
images can be seen in the bottom row of figure 8. The fail-
ure of our spoof images in the physical world motivates the
next steps of our attack.
6. PHYSICAL AND ANALOG CHANNELS
To extend our attack to the physical world, we created a
simplified physical world and a simulation of it, an analog
channel. We will use the term physical channel for passing
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Figure 8: Results of the exact attack. The spoof im-
ages are detected as faces if fed directly into Viola-
Jones. However, they are not detected by Viola-
Jones after passing through the physical world.
Figure 9: Our simplified physical world has a tablet
with retina and a fixed webcam in a low-glare box.
an image through our display and webcam in a box, and the
term analog channel for our software simulation of that.
Physical Channel. To build a reproducible physical attack
environment, we display the image on a tablet with a retina
display in a low glare box with a fixed webcam. See fig-
ure 9. To reduce the effect of browser image smoothing,
we expand the image several times before display, resulting
in image pixels displayed as crisp squares. Apart from the
fact that the display position is fixed, this is a fairly real-
istic simulation of an attack scenario, as the attacker can
carry a no-glare tablet and security webcams typically have
fixed locations. We then measured the effect of the physical
channel on images.
Individual Effects. We found that passing images through
our physical world has seven effects. We model five of them:
brightening the image center, adding noise, adding Gaussian
blur, reducing dark contrasts, and replicating pixels. We do
not model barrel distortion, as we assume its effect is slight.
We also do not yet model differences in alignment between
the image and camera pixel borders. We created test images
to help us measure each of these effects. As we consider each
effect, in each figure we show on the left a test image, in the
center an image after the physical channel, and on the right
5
Test Image After Physical After Analog
Figure 10: Channel center brightening.
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Test Image After Physical After Analog
Figure 11: An example of channel noise seen in a 10
by 10 pixel detail of a gray image. The bottom row
enhances the intensity differences by five.
an image after our analog channel.
To measure center brightening, we displayed a uniformly
gray test image and captured 300 video frames of it. Av-
eraging these frames gives us the average intensity for each
pixel, figure 10, that the camera sees when this uniform gray
image is displayed. We simulate this effect by adding to the
input image the difference between the average image and
the average image’s average pixel value. Our analog channel
winds up a bit darker than the physical channel.
The channel noise can be seen by first removing the center
brightening effect. We subtract the average image from a
single frame, and then add back the test image. A detail of
the result can be seen in figure 11. We get a noise distribu-
tion by subtracting from each frame the average image and
estimate the distribution of the resulting differences (across
all pixels). We found that this distribution is well-fit by a
normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation
1.5 (see figure 12). Thus, to approximate the noise, our ana-
log channel adds Gaussian noise with standard deviation 1.5
to the intensity of each pixel.
To assess channel blur, we displayed a test image with ver-
tical bars whose width is one to four pixels. The result can
seen in figure 13. Our analog channel uses a Gaussian blur
with standard deviation 0.9, as we found that this matches
the observed effects well.
The physical channel has a non-linear effect on pixel inten-
sities: for example, it reduces the contrast in dark regions
and increases the contrast for light intensities, as shown
in figure 14. We found that this can be modelled with a
Figure 12: The distribution of additive noise im-
posed by the channel to each pixel intensity: we
show both the observed distribution from the phys-
ical channel and the distribution of noise added by
our simulated analog channel.
Test Image After Physical After Analog
Figure 13: Channel blur effects.
Test Image After Physical After Analog
Figure 14: Channel contrast changes. Contrast
is lost between darker values and gained between
lighter ones.
piecewise-linear intensity response curve applied uniformly
to all pixels: a pixel with intensity x becomes intensity f(x),
where f is a piecewise-linear function. We found that two
pieces are sufficient to fit the observed response curve well.
Our physical channel setup displays each 120-pixel-tall spoof
image so the image will fill most of the 480 pixel webcam
6
Figure 15: A naive oracle for our search algorithm.
Figure 16: Our oracle measures how often a face is
detected when repeatedly subjecting the image to
the analog channel.
height. As a result, each pixel of the spoof image fills ap-
proximately a 4x4 grid of pixels in the image captured by
the webcam, though we make no attempt to position the
spoof image to align exactly with a grid of four by four web-
cam pixels and the displayed image does not fill the webcam
height exactly. Our analog channel simulates this by upscal-
ing the 120x96 spoof image to a 480x384 image (using pixel
replication, i.e., each pixel is replicated in a 4x4 grid) before
applying the other effects.
Analog Channel. Our analog channel simply chains to-
gether these individual effects: we apply upscaling, center
brightening, response curve (contrast reduction), Gaussian
blur, and Gaussian noise, in that order. Though our analog
channel is not a perfect simulation of the physical world’s
effects, it captures many of the effects that appear to affect
face detection and has allowed us to get useful results. Our
evaluation of the analog channel is described later (§9).
7. ORACLE
We use the analog channel to build an oracle (figure 15)
which predicts whether a face will be detected after an image
is degraded by the physical channel.
Naively, we might simply apply the analog channel to the
image and then apply the Viola-Jones to the result. How-
ever, because the noise is partially random, this is not a good
predictor of whether an image will be reliably detected as a
face: even though Viola-Jones detects a face in the degraded
image, the noise might have just been in our favor that one
time.
It is more useful to repeat the procedure multiple times. Our
oracle passes the image in parallel through several copies of
the analog channel, runs Viola-Jones on each result, and
reports how many times Viola-Jones detected a face (see
figure 16).
8. ATTACK: RANDOM SHIFT (ANALOG)
We use our simulation of the physical world to improve the
attack and generate spoof images that are more robust to
degradation and noise from the real world. We use the same
simple search procedure as before: pick a random pixel,
move its intensity closer to the corresponding pixel in the
cover image, and discard the change if our oracle reports
failure. But now we use our upgraded oracle that uses sev-
eral copies of the analog channel. Also, for each search, we
allow shifting the pixel value not just 50% toward the cover
image, but some shift rate, s ∈ (0, 1).
Algorithm 2: Analog attack
1 Function Search(F , C, s, n, m):
Input : Face image F ,
Cover image C,
Shift rate s,
Required detections by Oracle n,
Number of tests by Oracle m
Output: Spoof image S
2 S ← F ;
3 while not Stalled(S) do
4 p′ ← a random pixel in S
5 T (p)←{
Round (S(p)× (1− s) + C(p)× s) if p = p′
S(p) o.w.
6 if Oracle(T , m)≥ n then
7 S ← T
8 return S
9 Function Stalled(S):
Input : Image S
Output: Boolean
10 Return True if S has not changed in last several calls.
11 Function Oracle(T , m):
Input : Test Image T
Output: Boolean
12 Invoke Viola-Jones(Analog(T )) m times and return
how many times it detects a face with bounds within
10% of those of the face in F .
Initially, we tested the attack with a naive oracle that only
applies the analog channel once. However, we found that
the search quickly gets driven towards local minima: it tries
a change that actually causes the image to be detected only
occasionally (say, 10% of the time), but due to bad luck,
the image is accepted by the oracle. Because the search
algorithm tries many candidate changes, many of which are
bad, eventually it will get unlucky and accept a bad change.
Once it has moved towards a bad image, the algorithm is
unable to recover. As the search progresses, bad choices
vastly outnumber good choices — most choices are bad —
so the algorithm has a high probability of going awry.
We next tested an oracle that tries multiple times and re-
quires a face be detected at least 2 out of 3 times (or 4 out
of 5 times), but we found this suffers from the same prob-
lem. Therefore, we settled on an oracle applies the analog
channel 10 times and requires that a face be detected in all
10 out of 10 trials. We found that this was sufficient to fix
the problem.
7
iters 16,144 17,005 22,614 26,681
S
p
o
o
fs
A
ft
er
A
n
a
lo
g
detect % 100 100 87 96
A
ft
er
P
h
y
si
ca
l
detect % 18 9 97 70
Figure 17: Spoof images generated by our algo-
rithm, using an all-white cover image and shift rate
s = 0.7. We also show an example of applying the
analog and physical channel to each image and the
detection rates after each channel.
Experiment. We prepare the input face the same way as in
§5. We use cover images of granite and all-white and a shift
rate of s = 0.7. Low shift rates (e.g., s = 0.05) take a long
time and tend to create a faint but visible shadow of a face.
Moderately high shift rates (e.g., s = 0.7) and an all-white
cover image tend to create abstract dot art. Very high shift
rates (e.g., s = 0.9) tend to fail quickly. Each run takes a
few hours. We have not yet parallelized the analog channel
nor used a GPU. The analog channel is expensive, though
about a third of the cost is Viola-Jones anyway.
Results. Figure 17 shows a spoof image generated using this
algorithm and an all-white cover image: see the two images
in the upper-right. These images do not stand out to us as
faces — they look rather like some kind of abstract art — but
Viola-Jones detects a face in them, even after applying the
physical channel. The image on the upper-right is detected
as a face 70% of the time (after the physical channel); the
image to its left is detected as a face 97% of the time, i.e.,
very reliably.
The four columns in figure 17 correspond to different points
in time along the evolution of a single run of the search algo-
rithm. We show the number of iterations so far, the current
spoof image (i.e., S), an example of applying our analog
channel to that image and the detection rate after applying
the analog channel many times, as well as an example image
after applying the physical channel and the detection rate
after applying the physical channel many times.
Running our algorithm with a granite cover image was not
Figure 18: Evaluating how well the analog channel
models the physical channel. We plot the face detec-
tion rate after the physical channel vs. face detec-
tion rate after the analog channel, for 1200 different
images seen at different iterations of our algorithm.
The analog channel helps avoid some images that
would fail the physical channel, but far from guar-
antees success: the physical detection rate is gen-
erally at most the analog detection rate, but often
substantially smaller.
successful. It takes 9,000 iterations until the algorithm gen-
erates a candidate spoof image that is no longer human-
recognizable, but the images stop being recognized by Viola-
Jones as faces well before that — after 6,000 iterations, the
detection rate after the physical channel drops to zero.
Discussion. Our approach is successful at creating images
that are often detected by Viola-Jones as a faces, but which
are not as noticed by humans as faces. The images are not
as stealthy to humans as before, but they are more robust:
they are detected even after being displayed on a tablet and
then captured by a camera.
Our attack uses Viola-Jones solely as a black box, obtaining
only a boolean result from it. One can view the randomized
analog channel and 10-out-of-10 oracle as a way of obtaining
a probabilistic measure of success (a continuous confidence
metric) from this black box. Thus, our techniques might be
of independent interest for attacking other machine learn-
ing classifiers, specifically in situations where the attacker is
forced to use the classifier solely as a black box and cannot
obtain any kind of confidence score, likelihood estimate, or
other quantitative measure from the classifier.
9. EVALUATION OF ANALOG CHANNEL
To evaluate the effectiveness of our simulated analog chan-
nel, we ran many images through both the analog channel
and physical channel to compare the face detection rate af-
ter each. We gathered 1200 images seen during runs of our
algorithm. For each image, we fed it through the physical
channel 100 times and counted how many times Viola-Jones
detected a face in the result. We also did the same for the
8
analog channel. Figure 18 shows a scatterplot of the result-
ing scores. We see that the score from the analog channel
is an imperfect but useful predictor of the physical channel:
the analog channel helps us rule out some images that won’t
survive the physical channel, but is sometimes too optimistic
about the likelihood that Viola-Jones will detect a face after
the physical channel is applied. This explains why our or-
acle helps improve the search algorithm: while not perfect,
it provides feedback to help the random search avoid some
images that certainly won’t survive the physical channel.
10. FAILEDATTACK:GRADIENTDESCENT
Before arriving at the simple algorithm described earlier,
we tried other approaches. Most notably, we tried an ap-
proach inspired by gradient descent, where we tried to mea-
sure which pixels Viola-Jones is most sensitive to.
To approximate the gradient of the detector’s confidence
that the image is a face, we first found a blend of the cur-
rent image and the cover image that was right on the edge
of Viola-Jones’ decision boundary. In particular, we used
binary search to find the largest real number α ∈ [0, 1] such
that the blend (1−α)×S+α×C was still detected by Viola-
Jones, then reduced α slightly and set S′ = (1−α)×S+α×C.
This gave us an image S′ in the search space close to the
decision boundary. We then picked small regions of pixels
and saw how close to the cover image we could move them
as a group before Viola-Jones failed. Doing this for overlap-
ping regions gave us a measure of how sensitive Viola-Jones
was to changes to each pixel. In this way, we built an ap-
proximate sensitivity map M , where M(p) is proportional
to how far we can move pixel p of T towards C(p) before
Viola-Jones stops detecting a face (i.e., larger values of M(p)
indicate lower sensitivity to changes to p). Then, we used
this information to move the original image S closer to the
cover image, weighted to move the less sensitive pixels the
most: i.e., we replaced S with the image T defined by
T (p) = (1− ε ·M(p))× S(p) + ε ·M(p)× C(p),
for some small constant ε > 0. We iterated this process until
convergence.
While slow, this process created images with just the key
face features left. Unfortunately, those images were read-
ily human-recognizable as faces; see, e.g., figure 19. The
randomness of our current approach seems to hide the face
better.
11. RELATEDWORK
There has not been published work on stealthy spoofs of 2D
face detection. Work in the opposite direction has tried to
hide from facial detection with obvious[4] or less obvious[3]
makeup or partial obscurement.
Recent work on physical world attacks on object recognition
measured the degradation in effectiveness of adversarial im-
ages when they are first printed and photographed with a
cell phone[5]. Though they measure the effects of compo-
nents of that physical channel, they construct their images
using knowledge of the object detection algorithm, and not
the channel. Our work constructs adversarial images with-
out knowledge of the detection algorithm.
Figure 19: An image generated using our gradient
descent-inspired attack.
12. CONCLUSION
We have shown that deliberate spoof images can be created
that do not appear to humans as faces, yet Viola-Jones of-
ten detects as faces, even after passing through a simulated
physical world. This indicates that facial detection can be
fooled, and in a way that human observers are unlikely to
notice as suspicious.
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